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IPBES: Don’t throw out the baby whilst keeping the bathwater;
Put people’s values central, not nature’s contributions
Jasper O. Kenter
Department of Environment and Geography, University of York, YO10 5NG, United Kingdom
A B S T R A C T
IPBES has replaced the term ‘ecosystem services’ with ‘nature’s contributions to people’. This make-over does little to address the semantic problems associated with
ecosystem services. The ‘new’ term still characterises the relation between nature and people as one-way and the value of nature as instrumental (as a provider of
beneﬁts), masking human agency and broader values. By replacing ecosystem services with a near-synonymous term, IPBES ditches the baby (the successful term
ecosystem services), whilst keeping the dirty bathwater (the problems with the term). This distracts from the otherwise much-improved comprehensiveness of its
valuation framework in terms of pluralism. To be genuinely inclusive, IPBES should use an altogether diﬀerent headline terminology that centres around people’s
values and makes objects of value such as ecosystem services subsidiary. This allows diverse conceptions of human-nature relating and plural values of nature to
genuinely stand on a par, whilst not ditching the baby. In the end, we can only integrate values in environmental governance, not services or contributions —
ultimately it is the societal importance ascribed to nature that matters.
1. Introduction
Since the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel for
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), articulation of a new
conceptual framework for ecosystem services has been a keystone ac-
tivity. Recently, IPBES authors Díaz et al. (2018) proposed for the term
‘nature’s contributions to people’ (NCP) to succeed ‘ecosystem services’
at the core of the IPBES framework. The authors argue that while
ecosystem services have made strong inroads into policy discourses,
their framing has been too narrow to engage broader social science and
indigenous perspectives. They note that ecosystem services are asso-
ciated with a stock-ﬂow model of nature-human relationships and bias
towards western scientiﬁc and economic perspectives of nature. In
contrast, IPBES seeks a pluralistic approach to knowledge and values,
incorporating a broad set of western and non-western ontologies,
epistemologies and axiologies of human-nature relations. The term NCP
would better help meet this objective.
In this paper, I will argue that, while the term ecosystem services
has inherent semantic limitations, the near-synonymous term NCP does
little to address these and is, in some respects, more problematic. There
is undeniably dirty bathwater associated with the term ecosystem ser-
vices, such as the perception that the ﬁnal purpose of their valuation is
to commodify and privatise nature, although the ecosystem services
ﬁeld has in reality not taken this direction (Braat, 2018; Costanza et al.,
2017). But while ‘contribution’ might sound less market-oriented than
‘service’, the term NCP still semantically expresses an instrumental,
anthropocentric slant, emphasising nature as an instrument to human
well-being. Thus, replacing ecosystem services with this ‘new’ (or not so
new, see Braat, 2018) term appears a rebranding exercise more driven
by politics than substance (also see De Groot et al., 2018), unfortunately
distracting us from more meaningful IPBES advancements. Instead, I
will argue, IPBES should more genuinely update its headline termi-
nology to reﬂect its inclusive thinking, and put peoples’ plural values of
nature central instead of either services or contributions. This way,
ecosystem services need not be ditched, but can be subsidiary to a
broader more comprehensive framing of inclusive valuation, thus
keeping the baby whilst just draining the dirty water.
Semantics and what headline terminology we choose are important;
the terms we use and emphasise inevitably inﬂuence how we frame and
think about issues (Lakoﬀ, 2010). It is important here to distinguish
between semantics, and concepts and frameworks. Díaz et al. (2018)
present an IPBES framework that has evolved from that of the Millen-
nium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005) and TEEB (2010). For ex-
ample, the new framework replaces the well-established division in
provisioning, regulating, cultural and supporting services with mate-
rial, non-material and regulating contributions so that, amongst other
reasons, culture is not relegated to a single category of services but
salient more broadly. My critique in this paper is not directed towards
these broader changes but focuses on the term NCP — IPBES’ central,
headline term — and what this term implies. For the sake of compar-
ison, there are many diﬀerent conceptions and interpretations of the
term ecosystem services (Costanza et al., 2017; Braat & De Groot,
2012). Rather than comparing the concept of NCP to one or the other
concept of ecosystem services, I focus on unpicking some of the basic
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semantic similarities and diﬀerences between the two terms. Thus,
where I refer to NCP or ecosystem services, unless otherwise speciﬁed, I
refer to the terms, not the broader concepts or frameworks.
I will make my argument as follows. Firstly, NCP signiﬁes two dis-
crete objects (nature and people) with a discernible, unidirectional ﬂow
of beneﬁts (contributions) from one to the other. This does not reﬂect
how people contribute to nature, and masks co-production between
ecosystems and people and reciprocal values. Essentially, NCP fails to
reﬂect that relationships with nature are a two-way aﬀair. Indeed,
though still problematic in this regard, I will argue that ecosystem
services is the more encompassing term. I will next point out that
putting nature central as the provider of contributions continues to bias
towards a western realist epistemology. Finally, but crucially, the idea
of contributions to people continues to focus our attention on an in-
strumental frame of nature, i.e. as a source of human beneﬁts deemed
valuable. Thus, I propose that IPBES should not highlight any single
beneﬁt-focused term, and indeed not put nature as an object of value
central but plural values themselves. This provides a more compre-
hensive frame to encompass our living from, in and with nature, and the
diverse ways in which we can know and conceive of this.
2. Unpicking the semantics of nature’s contributions to people
Both the semantics of ecosystems providing services (and dis-ser-
vices) to people, and nature contributing (positively and negatively) to
people’s well-being, present a picture of nature and people as separate
objects, with a distinct directional ﬂow of beneﬁts from the former to
the latter. This directional focus is problematic ﬁrstly because it masks
the many contributions from people to nature, and the entanglement of
biodiversity and people in many ecosystems (Raymond et al., 2017).
For example, much biodiversity in semi-natural landscapes is depen-
dent on particular human practices such as herding and tree coppicing.
While human actions are typically portrayed as the primary cause of
biodiversity loss, not just our detrimental actions are to blame but also
the decline of beneﬁcial actions.
Furthermore, it is now well-established that ecosystem services are
in many cases co-produced by humans, i.e. their beneﬁts are partially
the product of human inputs (Costanza et al. 2017; Jones et al., 2016;
Raymond et al., 2017). This is acknowledged by the IPBES framework
as anthropogenic ‘assets’ feeding into NCP, and indeed IPBES goes
further by recognising the cultural constructedness of NCP (Díaz et al.,
2018). Moreover, IPBES, like other recent ecosystem service models
(e.g. Costanza et al. 2017; UK National Ecosystem Assessment, 2014; De
Groot et al. 2010), presents a cyclical frame with feedback eﬀects from
human well-being and governance institutions. IPBES also increasingly
emphasises relational values such as reciprocity (Díaz et al., 2018).
Many human value systems and religious practices include duties to
nature and reciprocal norms (Cooper et al., 2016).
However, this is all not reﬂected in the term NCP anymore so than
ecosystem services. NCP still imply that the ultimate recipients of the ﬂow
of beneﬁts are people with nature the sole provider. The term does not
reﬂect that relationships with nature are fundamentally a two-way aﬀair
of both nature contributing to people and people contributing to nature.
It can even be argued that NCP implies less agency to people than
ecosystem services. The noun contribution means “a gift or payment to a
common fund or collection” or “the part played by a person or thing in
bringing about a result or helping something to advance”, while the verb
contributemeans “to give in order to help achieve or provide something”,
or “to help to cause or bring about” (British Oxford Dictionary of English,
2018). The noun service means “the action of helping or doing work for
someone” or “a system supplying a public need”.1 At least the term
services implies an individual or collective beneﬁciary that demands or
needs the service; without this there is at most a potential service.
Whereas service implies a degree of symmetry between the demander
and the provider, the term contribution emphasises the contributor and
the aim of the contribution (i.e. what it seeks to achieve); an expression
of demand is not strictly necessary for something to be regarded as a
contribution as long as the contribution helps achieve something. This
opens up potential for mis- or abuse. For example, a transnational cor-
poration might take various actions to enable NCP and oﬀset its global
negative impacts on the environment, such as conserving an area of
rainforest, supporting its green credentials with its clients and share-
holders. But it is not inherent in the term NCP that what the company is
achieving is also demanded by those who supposedly beneﬁt (e.g. the
forest may not be managed in a way that meets local needs), who may be
subjected to NCP without consultation or consent. There are already
many instances where the term ecosystem services is misused due to lack
of understanding or abused to further a particular agenda (e.g. McHale
et al., 2018). The point here is that NCP opens up a further semantic
vector for misunderstandings and abuse and could jeopardise current,
gradually built up stakeholder understanding of ecosystem services.
The directional focus from nature to people also underlines nature
as the central, discrete object of investigation, even if just by virtue of
grammar. In contrast to what Díaz et al. (2018) claim, this continues
bias towards the realist knowledge perspective common to most of
western natural science, where the world can be known independently
of human experience. Many indigenous people and social science and
humanities disciplines present a diﬀerent view (e.g. Raymond et al.,
2017). Díaz et al. (2018) themselves discuss the perspective of the
Warlpiri, where nature and people are seen as one body and within a
reciprocal relationship. Making these worldviews ﬁt with NCP risks
reducing them, just as characterising them as ecosystem services would.
Finally, and crucially, the idea of contributions to people, while
sounding less economic, still reﬂects a similar instrumental ethical
slant, framing nature as a means to a human end. NCP are promoted by
Díaz et al. (2018) as being inclusive of non-instrumental values, and in
particular rights-based approaches, but they do not argue why this is
the case. It is not evident how contributions could encompass rights;
from our earlier discussion of the semantics of contributions, it is clear
that they are end-seeking, while rights are ends in themselves.
Of course, the instrumental nature of NCP does not necessarily equate
to the narrow, preference utilitarian perspective of neoclassical eco-
nomics much critiqued within this ﬁeld (e.g. Hejnowicz and Rudd, 2017;
Irvine et al., 2016; Kenter et al., 2015; Parks and Gowdy, 2013; Hockley,
2014; Chan et al., 2012; O’Neill et al., 2008; Forster, 1997). However, it
certainly paves the way for conceiving of nature in such a way. This is the
case because, if nature provides contributions (positively or negatively)
to people’s well-being in a number of ways (xn), an intuitive next step is
to consider how various policy or management options (yn) aﬀect xn, and
a third analytical step whether we can ﬁnd the yi that presents an optimal
way of trading oﬀ between x1…xn, or rank y1…yn in terms of optimality.
The simple elegance of this conceptualisation, accompanied by well-es-
tablished models and tools, and its ideological entrenchment within in-
stitutions for resource allocation (e.g. ministries of ﬁnance) give main-
stream economics a strong trump with decision makers, despite the vast
number of assumptions and simpliﬁcations required to operationalise
such comparisons (Hockley, 2014). Together, the instrumental concep-
tion of nature and bias towards a realist perspective for its understanding
provide the cornerstones for the dominant discourse of nature as a re-
source to be (more) eﬃciently managed. Replacing ecosystem services by
NCP does little to challenge this.
Even if NCP are seen in the way that least aligns with neoclassical
economics, as ‘nature’s gifts’ to people’s quality of life broadly envisaged,
this is still a limited conception of why nature matters, which will con-
tinue to lead to questions of inclusion and legitimacy. It is interesting to
note here that the word services can also be envisaged in diﬀerent eco-
nomic and non-economic ways that do not ring of utility optimisation.
1 I have omitted other meanings to the terms contribution and service that are
not relevant to our discussion, e.g. a contribution as a piece of writing or a
service as a religious rite.
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Public services provide public goods outside of the market. Social ser-
vices can be seen as a right as much as a beneﬁt. People provide public
service as a duty. In many spiritual traditions service is also associated
with duty and virtue. Indeed, many recent valuations in the ecosystem
services ﬁeld ﬁt with these non-market conceptions of services, with the
ﬁeld vastly expanding in terms of knowledge and value perspectives over
time connecting a wide range of disciplines (Costanza et al., 2017; Braat,
2018). But whether or not ecosystem services could be ‘redeemed’ in this
way (also see O’Neill, 2018), is, however, not ultimately important.
Elevating any model of human-nature relations will constrain values in
some way or implicitly emphasise certain types of values over others and
thus can be challenged on grounds of inclusivity. I will discuss how to
move beyond such an approach in the next section.
3. Inclusivity means putting people’s values central
Díaz et al. (2018) argue (again without evidencing this) that NCP
would enhance the eﬀectiveness and legitimacy of environmental po-
licies (presumably compared to ecosystem services). It would also help
overcome power asymmetries between diﬀerent knowledge perspec-
tives. The need to be inclusive “required IPBES to move to using NCP.”
(Díaz et al., 2018, p.271). From the argument I have made above, these
claims appear highly debatable. While the overall approach of IPBES is
undeniably more inclusive than that of the MEA, the proposal to re-
brand ecosystem services as NCP does not reﬂect this improvement but
detracts from it. While IPBES in theory seeks to regard all types of
values without bias, the emphasis on NCP unavoidably promotes a
subset in practice. For example, the title of Pascual et al. (2017), which
introduces the IPBES valuation framework, is “Valuing nature’s con-
tributions to people: the IPBES approach,” which by highlighting con-
tributions does not reﬂect that the framework also includes non-in-
strumental values. Apparently, all values (and conceptualisations of our
relation with nature) are equal but some are more equal than others.
What is needed is not to replace a successful but limiting headline
term with another equally limiting but unproven one, but an altogether
diﬀerent approach. Such an approach should put peoples’ plural values
themselves central in its framework and headline terminology, whilst
allowing for any number of conceptions of objects of value (such as
diverse interpretations of ecosystem services, nature’s gifts, right-
bearing aspects of nature, reciprocal relationships with nature, and
including conceptions where there is no clear distinction between the
valuer and object of value), but making all of these subsidiary. This
enables a genuine embrace of diverse knowledge and values.
In the remainder of this paper, I will discuss in more detail what I
mean when I propose to put values central. I will consider three aspects
of values that should be central to a comprehensive valuation frame-
work: ﬁrst that we need to equally consider transcendental and con-
textual values, secondly that we need a simple and inclusive way to
understand and communicate why nature matters, and thirdly that we
need to better recognise that environmental values are not necessarily
held or preformed, meaning that valuation should incorporate appro-
priate processes for value formation.
When I suggest to put values central, I take values to mean both the
importance we ascribe to nature (contextual values and their in-
dicators) as expressed in our attitudes, preferences and behaviour, and
our overarching life goals and principles (transcendental values) that
inﬂuence what we value in speciﬁc contexts (Kenter et al., 2015).
Transcendental values have thus far seen little consideration within
ecosystem assessment (Raymond and Kenter, 2016), even though they
are thought to play an important role in shaping our environmental
behaviour (Dietz et al., 2005). They are nominally part of the IPBES
valuation frame (though Pascual et al. (2017) mention only principles,
not broader life goals), but the focus on contributions continues to steer
attention towards contextual values.
In terms of the second aspect, a salient way of inclusively categor-
ising our values of nature is presented by O’Neill et al. (2008). They
point out that, fundamentally, our environment matters in three ways:
1) we live from it; the way that nature sustains us; 2) we live in it; the
way that the environment deﬁnes the spaces where our lives take place
and that we relate to and within; and 3) we live with it, where the
natural world extends beyond us, bearing a value that is beyond our
human interests and ends, yet which we can still consider and recognise
(O’Connor and Kenter, 2018). This may be a more eﬀective approach to
communicate values, especially to non-academics, than by using highly
abstract (e.g. instrumental, intrinsic) or ill-deﬁned (e.g. relational, so-
ciocultural) terms, and is able to encompass any number of conceptions
of the relationship between people and nature.
A third central aspect of understanding values that needs to be
considered is that values are not necessarily held in a preformed way by
individuals, waiting there to be measured, but may need to be formed
through a social process of informal or formal deliberation and ex-
pression, potentially resulting in shared or social values (Gregory et al.,
1993; Urama and Hodge, 2006; Spash, 2007; Kenter et al., 2011, 2015,
2016a,b; Irvine et al., 2016; Hansjürgens et al., 2017). Here, key
questions need to be considered in terms of how diﬀerent processes
shape diﬀerent values, depending on factors such as who participates,
power dynamics, and process design (Kenter et al., 2016c).
Putting values central allows us to genuinely promote assessment of
all values in relation to nature, in their diversity across these diﬀerent
aspects, without the constraints of a biased frame hungover from the
MEA. A further beneﬁt of putting values central instead of NCP or
ecosystem services is that it encourages drawing on a broader knowl-
edge base than is currently drawn upon by IPBES (also see Raymond
et al., 2018). By focusing on values, we can more eﬀectively cross over
into other, non-environmental arenas that deal with values and their
integration in decisions, from economic development to cultural studies
to the valuation of health and social care.
Finally, it is important to note that putting people’s values central in
this way does not preclude the consideration of biodiversity and eco-
system services in ecological or biophysical terms. Biophysical mea-
sures can be seen as contextual value indicators, because they are im-
bued with human judgements such as legal thresholds, targets, or
designated statuses, and these in turn reﬂect underlying transcendental
values around our relation to nature, such as the basic principle of
conservation biology that biodiversity is a good in itself (Meﬀe and
Caroll, 1994). Ecological understanding can thus also easily be related
to the diﬀerent ways in which nature matters, including living from
(e.g. nutrient cycling supporting agriculture), living in (e.g. ecological
history as part of our identity) and living with (e.g. population dy-
namics of species) values.
4. Conclusions
The move by IPBES to replace ecosystem services with NCP is an
outcome of politics, not rigorous thinking. The choice of this term simply
does not make sense in light of the leap forward in terms of the way that
IPBES has otherwise embraced shared, plural and cultural values
(Pascual et al., 2017). If IPBES wishes to treat diverse values associated
with living from, in and with nature as equal, why put a ‘new’ term
central that does not address any of the semantic limitations of ecosystem
services in this regard, yet, as Díaz et al. (2018) do, misguidedly argue it
is superior? This comes down to ditching the baby whilst leaving the
dirty bathwater. Ecosystem services are a potent and well-established
frame for assessing the value of nature to people to inform decisions. To
better reﬂect its limitations, the term should not be replaced, but its
frame be made subsidiary, treated as one amongst diverse con-
ceptualisations in broader, pluralistic, integrated assessments (see Jacobs
et al., 2016; Kenter, 2016) that put people’s values of nature central, en-
compassing living from, in and with the environment. This includes not
only the contextual values people individually and collectively express in
relation to nature, but also the transcendental values that guide our
cultural and ethical relationship with nature, voiced in questions such as:
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who are we in relationship to nature, what rights does nature have, what
role does nature play in living ‘the good life’ and what are just processes
for valuing nature? Finally, such a framework should place such pro-
cesses central not just for eliciting values but also for forming shared
social values expressing the common good.
In the end, we can only integrate values in governance, not services
or contributions. Services or contributions can just be integrated in-
directly; ultimately it is the societal importance that we ascribe to these
services or contributions, and biodiversity and nature more broadly,
that can be reﬂected in decisions. And it is only by changing our de-
cisions that nature can be safeguarded, whether for its own sake or for
its many services to peoples’ quality of life.
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